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ABSTRACT
Huge amounts of movement data are automatically collected
by technologies such as GPS, GSM, RFID, etc. Publishing
such data is essential to improve transportation, to under-
stand the dynamics of the economy in a region, etc. How-
ever, there are obvious threats to the privacy of individuals
if their trajectories are published in a way which allows re-
identification of the individual behind a trajectory. We con-
tribute to the literature on privacy-preserving publication of
trajectories by presenting: i) a distance measure for trajec-
tories which naturally considers both spatial and temporal
aspects of trajectories, is computable in polynomial time,
and can cluster trajectories not defined over the same time
span (something that previously proposed methods could
not do); ii) a method to replace a cluster of trajectories by
synthetic data that preserve all the visited locations and the
number of original trajectories, among other features; iii)
a comparison of our method with (k, δ)-anonymity [1] using
trajectories generated by the Brinkhoff’s generator [4] in the
city of Oldenburg.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4 [Computers and Security]: Privacy—anonymiza-
tion; H.3.3 [Information Search and Retrieval]: Clus-
tering, Information filtering—clustering and transforming
movement data
General Terms
Security, Algorithms
Keywords
Movement data, Trajectories, Distance, Data privacy,
Anonymization, Microaggregation
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
SPRINGL’10 November 2, 2010, San Jose, CA, USA
Copyright 2010 ACM 978-1-4503-0435-1/10/11 ...$15.00.
1. INTRODUCTION
Various technologies such as GPS, RFID, GSM, etc. can
sense and track whereabouts of objects. The ever increasing
capacity to store data allows such object movements data to
be collected in huge spatio-temporal databases. The study
of a database of spatio-temporal data (trajectories) can lead
to useful or previously unknown knowledge. Therefore, it
is beneficial to share and publish such databases and let
the analysts obtain useful knowledge —for example, knowl-
edge that can be applied in intelligent transportation, traf-
fic monitoring and planing, congestion trends, supply chain
management, etc. However, the privacy of individuals may
be affected by publishing the database or outsourcing it for
analysis.
Several kinds of threats to the privacy of individuals asso-
ciated with publishing databases of trajectories exist. Sim-
ple de-identification realized by removing identifying at-
tributes is insufficient to protect the privacy of individu-
als. The biggest threat with trajectories is the “sensitive
location disclosure”. In this scenario, knowing the times
in which an individual visited a few locations can help an
adversary to identify the individual’s trajectory in the pub-
lished database, and therefore learn the individual’s other
locations at other times. Privacy-preservation in this con-
text means that no sensitive location can be linked to an
individual.
The risks of sensitive location disclosure is also affected by
how much the adversary knows. The adversary may have ac-
cess to auxiliary information [11], also sometimes called side
knowledge, background knowledge and external knowledge.
The adversary can link such prior knowledge from other
sources to information in the published database. Capturing
the amount and extent of auxiliary information available to
the adversary is a challenging task.
There are quite a few differences between spatio-temporal
data and microdata, and the real difference becomes appar-
ent when considering privacy. Unfortunately, the traditional
anonymization and sanitization methods for microdata [9]
cannot be directly applied to spatio-temporal data without
considerable expenses in computation time and information
loss. Hence, there is a need for specific anonymization meth-
ods to thwart privacy attacks and therefore reduce privacy
risks associated with publishing trajectories.
1.1 Our contribution
We present a method for preserving the privacy of in-
dividuals when releasing spatio-temporal data about their
trajectories. The microaggregation approach [7] has been
successfully used in microdata anonymization to achieve k-
anonymity [15, 16]. We use a similar approach, first to clus-
ter the trajectories into clusters of size at least k based on
their similarity and then transforming the trajectories inside
each cluster to preserve privacy.
For clustering purposes, we propose a distance measure
for trajectories which naturally considers both spatial and
temporal aspects. Many distance measures have been pro-
posed for trajectories and time series (cf. [5]), however none
of them seems to satisfy the specifics required in anonymiza-
tion. The novelty of our distance measure lies in the ability
to compare trajectories that are not defined over the same
time span, something that previously proposed anonymiza-
tion methods based on similar principles could not do. Our
distance measure can compare trajectories that are timewise
overlapping only partially or not at all. It may seem at first
sight that the distance computation is exponential in the
terms of all considered trajectories, but we show that it is
in fact computable in polynomial time.
After forming clusters of trajectories, we propose a Swap-
Triples method which effectively anonymizes the trajecto-
ries in a given cluster. The method swaps locations in space
and time. This results in location preservation and as our
experiments show also minimal space distortion.
We theoretically and experimentally compare our pro-
posed anonymization method with a recent trajectory
anonymization called (k, δ)-anonymity [1]. Theoretical re-
sults show that the privacy preservation of our method is the
same as that of (k, δ)-anonymity when dealing with trajecto-
ries having the same time span, while we can also guarantee
privacy for trajectories not having the same time span. Our
experimental results on 1,000 synthetic trajectories gener-
ated by the Brinkhoff’s generator [4] in the German city of
Oldenburg indicate that, when considering the same distor-
tion, our re-identification probability is smaller.
In summary, our contributions are:
• A distance measure for trajectories which naturally
considers both spatial and temporal aspects of trajec-
tories, is computable in polynomial time, and can clus-
ter trajectories not defined over the same time span
(something that previously proposed methods could
not do);
• A method to replace a cluster of trajectories with syn-
thetic data that preserve all the visited locations and
the number of original trajectories, among other fea-
tures;
• A comparison with (k, δ)-anonymity [1] using trajec-
tories generated by the Brinkhoff’s generator [4] in the
city of Oldenburg.
1.2 Related work
Several anonymity notions and methods for trajectories
have been proposed [10, 1, 13, 17, 14, 18, 12]. Closest to
our approach are the k-anonymity like methods that are
also similar to the microaggregation approach [7] in their
use of clustering. Trajectory (k, δ)-anonymity [1] separately
anonymizes trajectories defined over the same time inter-
val by spatial translation —the points of trajectories in a
cluster are moved toward the δ radius of the cluster average
trajectory. When δ = 0, this is the traditional microag-
gregation (which replaces trajectories by the cluster cen-
troid) over trajectories having the same time span. Trajec-
tory k-anonymity by [13, 14] considers trajectories consist-
ing of ranges of coordinates and times that are generalized
into bounding boxes. Synthetic trajectories are then sam-
pled point-by-point from the obtained boxes. Trajectory k-
anonymity of [12] considers trajectories stripped of the time
information that are anonymized by first considering region-
ing and then publishing the centroids of the regions passed
by the trajectories. Similarly, the method of [17] considers
only sequences of points without the time information.
In contrast to these methods, we perform traditional mi-
croaggregation over all original trajectories —we do not spe-
cially and separately consider trajectories having the same
time span and we consider trajectories over points, not
ranges, without stripping the time information. We pub-
lish synthetic trajectories which are analogous to condensed/
microaggregation-based hybrid data for microdata [2, 6] and
for strings [3]. However, our synthetic trajectories can be
randomly sampled or can preserve the locations covered by
the original trajectories.
Additional related work about anonymization of spatio-
temporal data can be found in the literature about location-
based services. Anonymity is enforced on individual sensi-
tive locations and the data are anonymized on a per-request
basis. Here, we focus on publishing whole spatio-temporal
databases rather than providing anonymity for services and
protecting individuals from location-based service provides.
2. MICROAGGREGATION-BASED
ANONYMIZATION
Our method to anonymize trajectories is partially based
on microaggregation [7], and partially on hybrid data [6]
and condensation [2]. The method starts by clustering the
trajectories based on their similarity and proceeds by trans-
forming the obtained clusters in order to obtain anonymized
trajectories. The objective of the clustering (aggregation) is
to minimize the similarity measure among trajectories and
the constraint is to consider at least k trajectories in a clus-
ter.
Clustering trajectories requires defining a similarity mea-
sure —a distance between two trajectories. Because trajec-
tories are distributed over space and time, a distance that
considers both spatial and temporal aspects of trajectories
is needed. Many distance measures have been proposed in
the past for both trajectories of moving objects and for time
series (cf. [5]). They include among others the Euclidean
distance, Dynamic Time Warp (DTW), Edit distances with
real penalty (EDP) or on real sequences (EDR), and Longest
common subsequences (LCSS) distance. None of these mea-
sures can compare trajectories that do not overlap over time.
Therefore we define our own distance measure which can
compare trajectories that are timewise overlapping only par-
tially or not at all. We believe this is the right approach in
clustering trajectories for anonymization purposes.
2.1 Distance between two trajectories
Let location be a triple (t, x, y) with t being a timestamp
and (x, y) a point in R2. Intuitively, the triple denotes that
at time t an object is in the position (x, y). A sequence of
triples over time form a trajectory.
Definition 1 (Trajectory). A trajectory is an ordered set
of locations
T = {(t1, x1, y1), . . . , (tn, xn, yn)} , (1)
where ti < ti+1 for all 1 ≤ i < n.
Definition 2 (p%-contemporary trajectories). Two trajec-
tories
Ti = {(ti1, xi1, yi1), . . . , (tin, xin, yin)}
and
Tj = {(tj1, xj1, yj1), . . . , (tjm, xjm, yjm)}
are said to be p%-contemporary if
p = 100 ·min( I
tin − ti1
,
I
tjm − tj1
)
with I = max(min(tin, t
j
m)−max(ti1, tj1), 0).
Intuitively, two trajectories are 100%-contemporary if and
only if they start at the same time and end at the same
time; two trajectories are 0%-contemporary trajectories if
and only if they occur during non-overlapping time intervals.
Denote the overlap time of two trajectories Ti and Tj as
ot(Ti, Tj).
Definition 3 (Synchronized trajectories). Given two p%-
contemporary trajectories Ti and Tj for some p > 0, both
trajectories are said to be synchronized if they have the same
number of triples timestamped within ot(Ti, Tj) and these
correspond to the same timestamps. A set of trajectories
is said to be synchronized if all pairs of p%-contemporary
trajectories in it are synchronized, where p > 0 may be
different for each pair.
We assume that between two locations of a trajectory of
an object, the object is moving along a straight line be-
tween the locations at a constant speed. Interpolating new
locations on a given trajectory is then straightforward. Tra-
jectories can be then synchronized in the sense that if one
trajectory has a location at time t, then other trajectories
defined at that time will also have a (possibly interpolated)
location at time t. This rule guarantees that the set of new
locations interpolated in order to synchronize trajectories is
of minimum cardinality. Algorithm 1 describes this process.
Algorithm 1 Trajectory synchronization
Require: T = {T1, . . . , TN} a set of trajectories to be syn-
chronized, where each Ti ∈ T is of the form:
Ti = {(ti1, xi1, yi1), . . . , (tini , xini , yini)}
1: Let TS = {tij | (tij , xij , yij) ∈ Ti : Ti ∈ T } be all
timestamps from all locations of all trajectories.
2: for all Ti ∈ T do
3: for all ts ∈ TS with ti1 < ts < tini do
4: if location having timestamp ts is not in Ti then
5: insert new location to Ti having the timestamp
ts and coordinates interpolated from the two
timewise-neighboring locations
6: end if
7: end for
8: end for
Definition 4 (Distance between trajectories). Consider a
set of synchronized trajectories T = {T1, . . . , TN} where
each trajectory is written as
Ti = {(ti1, xi1, yi1), . . . , (tini , xini , yini)} .
The distance between trajectories is defined as follows. If
Ti, Tj ∈ T are p%-contemporary with p > 0, then
d(Ti, Tj) =
1
p
√√√√ ∑
t`∈ot(Ti,Tj)
(xi` − xj`)2 + (yi` − yj` )2
|ot(Ti, Tj)|2 .
If Ti, Tj ∈ T are 0%-contemporary but there is at least one
subset of T
T k(ij) = {T ijk1 , T ijk2 , . . . , T ijknijk} ⊆ T
such that T ijk1 = Ti, T
ijk
nijk
= Tj and T
ijk
` and T
ijk
`+1 are
p`%-contemporary with p` > 0 for ` = 1 to n
ijk − 1, then
d(Ti, Tj) = min
T k(ij)
nijk−1∑
`=1
d(T ijk` , T
ijk
`+1)

Otherwise d(Ti, Tj) is not defined.
The computation of the distance between every pair of
trajectories is not exponential as it could seem from the
definition. Polynomial-time computation of a distance graph
containing the distances between all pairs of trajectories can
be done as follows.
Definition 5 (Distance graph). A distance graph is a
weighted graph where
(i) Nodes represent trajectories,
(ii) two nodes Ti and Tj are adjacent if the corresponding
trajectories are p%-contemporary for some p > 0, and
(iii) the weight of the edge (Ti, Tj) is the distance between
the trajectories Ti and Tj .
Now, given the distance graph for T = {T1, . . . , TN}, the
distance d(Ti, Tj) for two trajectories is easily computed as
the minimum cost path between the nodes Ti and Tj , if
such path exists. The inability to compute the distance for
all possible trajectories (the last case of Definition 4) natu-
rally splits the distance graph into connected components.
The connected component that has the majority of the tra-
jectories should be kept, while the remaining components
present outlier trajectories that are discarded in order to
preserve privacy. Finally, given the connected component of
the distance graph having the majority of the trajectories
of T , the distance d(Ti, Tj) for any two trajectories on this
connected component is easily computed as the minimum
cost path between the nodes Ti and Tj . In terms of compu-
tational costs, the minimum cost path between every pair of
nodes can be compute using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm
with computational cost O(N3), i.e., in polynomial time.
2.2 Clustering algorithm
Any constrained clustering algorithm can now be used
with this distance in order to cluster trajectories, as outlined
in Algorithm 2. We limit ourselves to clustering algorithms
that try to minimize the sum of the intra-cluster distances
or approximate the minimum. The constraints are that each
cluster should be of size at least k and at most 2k−1, where
k is an input parameter.
The purpose of limiting the size of each cluster between k
and 2k − 1 is twofold. First, the purpose is to provide pri-
vacy by performing anonymization on at least k trajectories.
Second, the purpose is also to minimize information loss by
capping the maximum cluster size at 2k − 1 trajectories in
order to control the possible distortion: indeed, a cluster of
size 2k can be split into two clusters of size k, whose separate
anonymization fulfills the privacy requirement and leads to
better data utility. Examples of clustering algorithms in-
clude the Greedy Clustering (described in Section 4 below)
and Maximum Distance to Average Vector (MDAV) meth-
ods [8].
Algorithm 2 Cluster-based trajectory anonymization
Require: T = {T1, . . . , TN} a set of trajectories such that
d(Ti, Tj) is defined for all Ti, Tj ∈ T .
1: Use any clustering algorithm to cluster the trajectories
of T , while minimizing the sum of intra-cluster distances
measured with the distance defined in Definition 4 and
ensuring that minimum cluster size is at least k.
2: Let C1, C2, . . . , Cn(T ) be the resulting clusters.
3: for all clusters Ci do
4: C?i = SwapTriples(Ci, R
t
i, R
s
i ) // Algorithm 3
5: end for
2.3 Trajectory anonymization
Every trajectory anonymization algorithm must combine
utility and privacy. However, utility and privacy are two
largely antagonistic concepts. What is useful in a set of
trajectories is application-dependent, so for each utility fea-
ture probably a different anonymization algorithm is needed.
The utility features that are usually considered are: (i)
length preservation, (ii) shape preservation, (iii) time preser-
vation, and (iv) minimization of the number of discarded
trajectories. We include another utility feature that is re-
ally meaningful in city scenarios: location preservation. This
essentially means that the set of locations visited by the
original trajectories is preserved: all locations visited by the
original trajectories are also visited by the anonymized tra-
jectories. Without location preservation, an adversary may
be able to distinguish true locations and fake locations that
are inserted by some anonymization methods. Hence, loca-
tion preservation is not just good for utility but it is also
good for privacy: the adversary cannot discard any fake lo-
cations, because the true original locations are preserved.
To achieve this anonymization, we propose the SwapTriples
method, presented in Algorithm 3.
SwapTriples takes a cluster Ci as input and it outputs a
cluster C?i containing the transformed trajectories obtained
from the original ones in cluster Ci. We denote the trans-
formed trajectories, triples, and sets with a star. We refer to
T as the original trajectories and to T ? as the anonymized
trajectories. Analogously, T ? ∈ T ? is called an anonymized
trajectory. To obtain a transformed trajectory correspond-
ing to a given original trajectory, each triple in the original
trajectory can be swapped with a triple in another origi-
nal trajectory provided that the timestamps of both triples
differ no more than a time threshold Rti and the spatial co-
ordinates of both triples are no more distant than a space
threshold Rsi .
Algorithm 3 SwapTriples(Ci, R
t
i, R
s
i )
Require: Ci a cluster of trajectories to be transformed, R
t
i
a time threshold, and Rsi a space threshold.
1: Mark all trajectories in Ci as “available”.
2: Mark all triples in the trajectories of Ci as “unswapped”.
3: while “available” trajectories are left in Ci do
4: Let T ′ be the longest “available” trajectory in Ci.
5: Let n′ be the length of T ′.
6: for j = 1 to n′ do
7: if j-th triple (t′j , x
′
j , y
′
j) of T
′ is “unswapped” then
8: Let S′j be the set of “unswapped” triples in Ci of
the form (tsj , x
s
j , y
s
j ) with
|tsj − t′j | ≤ Rti√
(xsj − x′j)2 + (ysj − y′j)2 ≤ Rsi .
9: if S′j = ∅ then
10: Leave (t′j , x
′
j , y
′
j) unaltered and mark it as
“swapped”.
11: else
12: Swap (t′j , x
′
j , y
′
j) with a triple randomly cho-
sen in S′j and mark both swapped triples as
“swapped”.
13: end if
14: Mark T ′ as “unavailable”.
15: end if
16: end for
17: end while
18: Return a cluster C?i containing the transformed trajec-
tories.
3. PRIVACY AND UTILITY
We argue that k-anonymity applied to trajectories can-
not always be realized: in particular, if the time and/or
space thresholds used in Algorithm 3 are too small w.r.t.
to the spread of original trajectories, often there will be
less than k different trajectories with which a certain origi-
nal trajectory can swap triples. Therefore we use the loca-
tion re-identification probability as our privacy risk measure.
We compare this privacy guarantee with the one of (k, δ)-
anonymity [1] and show that when trajectories are defined
over the same time span, we provide the same level of pri-
vacy.
Anonymizing trajectories needs to preserve utility as much
as possible. In particular, we deal with several concerns re-
garding utility – the utility features that are usually consid-
ered by the users of the anonymized data and are discussed
above in the previous section. We recall and present metrics
for measuring the utility of anonymized trajectories.
3.1 Deficiency of k-anonymity for anonymiz-
ing trajectories
The notion of k-anonymity [15, 16] has been originally
proposed for microdata, i.e., transactional and relational
databases. If the data satisfy the k-anonymity definition,
an individual represented by a record in the microdata can-
not be identified with probability higher than 1/k because
his/her record cannot be distinguished within a group of at
least k records. The k-anonymity notion can be extended to
other types of data, including trajectories [1, 13, 14, 12]. Un-
fortunately, a direct extension of k-anonymity cannot pro-
tect the privacy of trajectories as shown in the following
example.
Suppose that the adversary has trajectory T consisting
of only one location – individual’s home at 8am. Assume
straightforward k-anonymity has been achieved, in such a
way that there are at least k anonymized trajectories in
T ? having an anonymized version of T as a sub-trajectory,
where a sub-trajectory is a selection of triples of a trajec-
tory. This means that there will be k anonymized trajec-
tories containing the single location of T . However, not all
of these anonymized trajectories start at the single location
of T . Since an individual’s home at 8am is likely to be the
first location of any individual’s original trajectory, those
anonymized trajectories that do not start at the single loca-
tion of T (just pass through it) can be filtered out by an ad-
versary and only the remaining trajectories are considered.
In this way, using side knowledge the adversary identifies less
than k anonymized trajectories compatible with the original
trajectory T . Hence, straightforward k-anonymity does not
imply actual trajectory k-anonymity.
We believe that our anonymization approach, which
considers location re-identification, better fits the spatio-
temporal data anonymization.
3.2 Re-identification probability
Because k-anonymity is insufficient in the trajectories
setting, we measure the privacy risk as the location re-
identification probability. It represents the average risk, mea-
sured as a probability, of re-identification of a location by
an adversary in the anonymized trajectories T ? obtained
with SwapTriples from the original trajectories T . Be-
cause the swap options to anonymize a location depend on
each particular cluster, we consider the average location re-
identification probability that cumulatively captures proba-
bilities over all clusters.
Theorem 1. Given a set T = {T1, . . . , TN} of trajecto-
ries anonymized as T ? = {T ?1 , . . . , T ?N} using Algorithm 2,
the average location re-identification probability is
1
S(T , T ?) ,
where S(T , T ?) is the average number of swap options that
each location in the original trajectories had in the swapping
process (the number of swap options depends on the trajec-
tories and also on the parameters Rti’s and R
s
i ’s used to call
Algorithm 3).
We recall the (k, δ)-anonymity [1] definition in order to
compare our privacy guarantee with it under the assumption
that all trajectories are defined over the same time span.
Definition 6 ((k, δ)-anonymity [1]). A set C of trajectories
defined over the timestamps TS having the form
Ti = {(t, xit, yit) | t ∈ TS}
satisfies (k, δ)-anonymity if |C| ≥ k and ∀Ti, Tj ∈ C and
∀t ∈ TS holds√
(xit − xjt)2 + (yit − yjt )2 ≤ δ .
Our privacy guarantee can be the same as the one of (k, δ)-
anonymity when considering trajectories defined over the
same time span. We note however that our anonymization
approach and privacy guarantee are also applicable to tra-
jectories with partial or even no time overlap.
Theorem 2. Let C be a set (cluster) of at least k tra-
jectories defined over the same time span. There exist δ
such that the trajectories anonymized by SwapTriples satisfy
(k, δ)-anonymity.
Proof. For any space threshold Rs and any time thresh-
old Rt, the anonymized trajectories of the set C? =
SwapTriples(C,Rs, Rt) will collectively span the same time
and some space. By assumption, all trajectories in C and
therefore all trajectories in C? are defined over the same set
of timestamps TS. Let δ be the maximal Euclidean distance
between any two points in two different trajectories in C?
sharing the same timestamp t ∈ TS. Then obviously, C?
satisfies (k, δ)-anonymity (of course, the constructed δ may
not be minimal).
3.3 Utility measures
Counting the number of removed trajectories as well
as the number of removed locations, whether during pre-
processing, clustering or cluster anonymization is easy.
Measuring the length of a trajectory is done in the obvious
way, as the length of the poly-line of a trajectory projected
on its spatial coordinates. We then compare the average
lengths of trajectories in original clusters and in distorted
clusters.
To capture the distortion of the trajectory shape, we use
the space distortion metric [1, Sec.VI.B], which also allows
to cumulatively consider the total space distortion of all
anonymized trajectories from original ones.
Definition 7 (Space distortion [1]). The space distortion
of an anonymized trajectory T ? with respect to its original
trajectory T at time t when T has location (t, x, y) and T ?
has possible location (t, x?, y?), is
SDt(T, T
?) =
{
∆((x, y), (x?, y?)) if (x?, y?) defined at t
Ω otherwise
where ∆ is a distance (e.g., Euclidean), and Ω a constant
that penalizes for removed points. The space distortion of
an anonymized trajectory T ? from its original T is then
SD(T, T ?) =
∑
t∈TS
SDt(T, T
?) ,
where TS are all the timestamps where T is defined. In
particular, if T is discarded during anonymization, T ? is
empty, and so SD(T, T ?) = nΩ, where n = |TS| is the
number of locations of T . Finally, the space distortion of a
set of trajectories T from its anonymized set T ? is
TotalSD(T , T ?) =
∑
T∈T
SD(T, T ?) ,
where T ? ∈ T ? (which may be empty) corresponds to T ∈ T .
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We used 1,000 synthetic trajectories generated with the
Brinkhoff’s generator [4] visiting 45,505 locations in the Ger-
man city of Oldenburg. Our results indicate that: (i) we dis-
card significantly fewer trajectories than (k, δ)-anonymity,
due to being able to consider also trajectories that do not
have the same time span; (ii) our algorithm falls short of en-
tirely preserving the lengths of trajectories, even though the
lengths of anonymized trajectories are strongly correlated
to the lengths of original trajectories; (iii) when considering
the same distortion achieved by (k, δ)-anonymity [1], our lo-
cation re-identification probability is smaller; and (iv) our
anonymization algorithm preserves all original locations, by
design.
4.1 Synthetic data generation
In practice, testing anonymization algorithms with real
data sets of trajectories is problematic, especially because
data sets having a significant number of trajectories are hard
to obtain. Hence, most anonymization algorithms are usu-
ally tested on synthetic data, which have the additional ad-
vantage of being easily transferable to other authors in view
of experiment reproducibility.
We used Brinkhoff’s generator [4] to obtain trajectories of
moving objects and evaluate and compare our anonymiza-
tion with other proposals. Synthetic data generated with
Brinkhoff’s generator have also been used for evaluation of
approaches like [1, 13, 14, 18].
The generation parameters over the map of Oldenburg in
Germany were: 6 moving object classes and 3 external ob-
ject classes; 10 moving objects and 1 external object gener-
ated per time stamp; 100 timestamps; speed 250; and “prob-
ability” 1,000. This resulted in 1,000 trajectories contain-
ing 45,405 points. The maximum trajectory length was 100
points, the average length was 45.4 points, and the median
length was 44 points.
4.2 Details of our approach
In our approach, a trajectory is removed only if the dis-
tance between it and some other trajectory cannot be com-
puted. In fact, given the distance graph G (see Definition 5),
our approach can only be used within one of the connected
components of G. During the construction of the distance
graph for the synthetic data we found 11 connected compo-
nents, 10 of them of size 1. Therefore, we removed these
10 trajectories in order to obtain a new distance graph with
just one connected component. In this way, we preserved
99% percent of all trajectories. The removed trajectories
were in fact trajectories of length one, i.e., just one location
in each one.
We implemented the standard Greedy Clustering method
and executed it for k = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 15. Greedy
Clustering first creates clusters of size k and disperses the
up to k−1 unclustered trajectories to existing clusters while
minimizing the intra-cluster distance. This algorithm incurs
no additional discarding of trajectories.
For the anonymization of trajectories in the cluster using
our SwapTriples method, we initially set for every i a time
threshold Rti = 100 and a space threshold R
s
i = 317. It is
important to remark that Rti = 100 is the entire time span
of the synthetic data (100 timestamps at 100 consecutive
time units), and Rsi = 317 is five times the average distance
between every pair of consecutive points inside the trajec-
tories. For successive anonymizations aimed at comparing
disclosure risk with (k, δ)-anonymity, we selected Rsi and R
t
i
in a way to obtain roughly the same total space distortion
values as in (k, δ)-anonymity (see Table 1).
4.3 Implementing (k, δ)-anonymity for com-
parison with our method
We compared our approach with (k, δ)-anonymity [1]. Be-
cause the (k, δ)-anonymity only works over trajectories hav-
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Figure 1: The number of removed trajectories in
our approach and in (k, δ)-anonymity for cluster size
k. Our approach discarded only 10 outlier trajecto-
ries while computing the distances among trajecto-
ries. (k, δ)-Anonymity discarded 227 trajectories in
the pre-processing step and additional ones during
clustering.
ing the same time span, first a pre-processing step that parti-
tions the trajectories is needed. By superimposing the begin
and end times of the trajectories by reducing times modulo
a parameter pi, it is not always possible to find at least k
trajectories having the same time span or it may happen
that a trajectory disappears because the new reduced end
time lies before the new reduced begin time.
We have used pi = 3 which kept the maximum (and so dis-
carded the minimum) trajectories. From the 1,000 synthetic
trajectories, 40 were discarded because the end time was less
than the begin time and 187 were discarded because there
were less than or equal to 4 trajectories having the same
time span. In total, 227 (22.7%) trajectories were discarded
just in the pre-processing step. The remaining 773 trajec-
tories were in 32 sets having the same time span, each set
containing a minimum of 15 trajectories and 24 on average.
We performed (k, δ)-anonymization for k = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10,
and 15 and δ = 0, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 and 5000. Because
of the pre-processing step, using a higher k was impossible
without causing a significant number of additional trajecto-
ries to be discarded.
4.4 Comparison, evaluation and discussion
Removed trajectories. Our approach discarded 10
outlier trajectories (1%) because the distance among them
and the others could not be determined. On the other
hand, (k, δ)-anonymity discarded 227 trajectories in the pre-
processing step, because their time span could not match
other trajectories, and discarded additional outlier trajecto-
ries during clustering, altogether discarding more than 24%
of trajectories. These results are depicted in Figure 1, and
it is clear that our approach outperforms (k, δ)-anonymity.
This is because we are able to consider also trajectories
that do not have the same time span, while (k, δ)-anonymity
needed to discard 22.7% of trajectories in the pre-processing
step.
Length of trajectories. Figure 2 shows that lengths of
the anonymized trajectories are proportional to the length of
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Figure 2: Average distance of the original trajectories and average distance of the distorted trajectories in
each cluster when k = 15 and SwapTriples used Rsi = 317 and R
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k values, but there are too many clusters to show.
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Figure 3: Total space distortion (TotalSD) of our
approach with different cluster size k and using
SwapTriples(·, Rsi = 317, Rti = 100) for every cluster.
the original trajectories. This is acceptable from a statistical
point of view, but we conclude that our approach does not
preserve the lengths of trajectories.
Space distortion. Figure 3 depicts total space distor-
tion of our approach with different cluster sizes k and using
space threshold Rsi = 317 and time threshold R
t
i = 100. In
comparison to (k, δ)-anonymity, whose total space distortion
is in Table 1, our approach achieves significantly lower dis-
tortion. Furthermore, the penalty constant Ω was set to 0
in the computation of the space distortion, partly because
we already considered the number of removed trajectories
separately. However, with any penalty Ω > 0, the TotalSD
would show even bigger gap between the two methods.
Re-identification probability. The two approaches we
are comparing use different parameters, and so we fix the
utility in order to compare privacy. Namely, for various k,
δ \ k 2 4 6 8 10 15
0 48e6 93e6 120e6 143e6 165e6 199e6
1,000 19e6 60e6 86e6 109e6 131e6 165e6
2,000 4e6 32e6 56e6 78e6 99e6 133e6
3,000 .9e6 14e6 32e6 52e6 71e6 104e6
4,000 .2e6 5e6 16e6 32e6 48e6 79e6
5,000 .03e6 2e6 7e6 18e6 31e6 58e6
Table 1: Total space distortion (TotalSD) of
(k, δ)-anonymity in millions. Compare with Fig-
ure 3 where our approach has TotalSD significantly
smaller.
we consider the total space distortion of (k, δ)-anonymity
as presented in Table 1. We subsequently choose time and
space thresholds (Rti and R
s
i ) for the particular cases in a
way so that our approach achieves roughly the same total
space distortion values.
Equipped with these privacy parameters, we present lo-
cation re-identification probabilities in Figure 4. For (k, δ)-
anonymity it is 1
k
, while for our approach it is mostly be-
low this probability. Furthermore, the higher the k, the
lower the location re-identification probability of our method
compared to 1
k
. That is, while the utility is the same for
both methods, the higher the aimed privacy, the more our
method outperforms (k, δ)-anonymity in what regards pri-
vacy preservation.
5. CONCLUSIONS
First, we define a new distance between two trajectories
that naturally combines time and space. We show that the
use of this distance considerably reduces the number of lo-
cations or trajectories that must be removed from the data
set.
Second, we propose a new method for anonymization of
spatio-temporal movement data via microaggregation that
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Figure 4: Location re-identification probability of
our approach when considering total space distor-
tion (TotalSD) values shown in Table 1 and cluster
size k = 6, 8, 10, 15. Mostly our re-identification prob-
abilities are below the 1
k
re-identification probabil-
ities offered by (k, δ)-anonymity. The trend is that
the higher the aimed privacy – the higher the k, the
lower the re-identification probability of our method
vs (k, δ)-anonymity.
uses the proposed distance. The most obvious contributions
of our method are: (i) it can deal with trajectories with
partial or no time overlap; (ii) it preserves the visited loca-
tions after the anonymization process; (iii) it substantially
reduces the proportion of discarded trajectories vs (k, δ)-
anonymity (a similar approach, except that it only works
over trajectories having a 100% time overlap). Moreover,
we show that using the same levels of space distortion as
(k, δ)-anonymity, we reach lower location re-identification
probabilities, i.e., for roughly the same levels of utility we
achieve higher levels of privacy; and (iv) although length
preservation is not exactly ensured, there is a strong cor-
relation between the length of original trajectories and the
length of the anonymized trajectories.
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